

The Globalization Debate: The Sceptics

Tadija Tadić*

Summary: A devastating criticism of a 'hard core' argumentation, stemming from sceptical authors, has strongly challenged an enthusiasm noticeable in most theoretical analyses of globalization, bringing to light many 'darker sides' of the globalization phenomena. A detailed critical re-examination of their often unrealistic assumptions has presented a very serious challenge to globalists and has made room for the arising of the so called 'great globalization debate', which has started over time to shape the mainstream of the contemporary social philosophy. In this paper we are closely looking into the way in which sceptics realize their devastating criticism of globalists' argumentation.

Key words: Globalization, The great globalization debate, Sceptics.

JEL: F0, F15, N0

1. Introduction

The starting point of the research into the great globalization debate was to construct a relatively simple analytical frame which had been initiated in the previous paper (Tadic 2006). It was aimed at identifying critical globalists' assumption and to simplify the analysis of their often very complex argumentation. The follow-up of the research in which sceptics' perspective will be presented as the other aspect of the debate will be assessed through the same analytical frame (Tadic 2006). Conceptualization of the globalization phenomenon, its causes and effects and the prediction of the future global development as its essential constituents will be the three main topics at issue towards which sceptics' argumentation analysis will gravitate.

The criticism is generally levelled at the destruction of the globalistic argumentation hard core by which globalization represents a new epoch of the human history unprecedented in earlier times. For that reason, two methodological approaches which sceptics follow and upon which they base their conclusion

* The paper presented is the second part of the research into the great globalization debate between globalists and sceptics. After a detailed analysis of the globalists' perspective basic assumptions dealt with in our paper published in the previous number of *Panoeconomicus*, we continue with presenting the central points of the opposite side of this debate, namely sceptics. It is necessary to point out that this paper is part of a more extensive research which is being carried out under professor Kosta Josifidis' mentorship: tadictadija@neobee.net

that mere concept of globalization has no explanatory or predictive value will be elaborated first. Based on this belief, sceptics continue with the gradual refutation of other (hyper) globalistic myths, particularly their often exaggerated interpretations of the consequences of the globalization phenomenon. With reference to this, the following aspect will elaborate the sceptics' criticism of the globalists' solutions concerning economic, political and cultural issues as globalistic consequences. At the end, in the last instance, the sceptics' alternative vision of the global change future development will be presented as; it will turn out that way, based on a completely different belief compared to quite naive, neoliberal prophecies about "the end of history"(Fykujama 1989).

2. Sceptics

The majority of globalists' assumptions, especially those radical ones, has come under attack of sceptically oriented theoreticians¹ for whom globalization is not "an epochal transformation of world affairs" but a myth which "conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national governments remain very powerful" (Held *et al.* 1999, p. 2). With purpose of refuting of the hard core of hyperglobalists' argumentation, sceptics usually conduct careful empirical testing of the "the strong globalist thesis" mentioned above. There are two main methodological models under which this is realized. The first direction dominant over the greater part of sceptical analysis is based upon constructing abstract models of global economy, global culture and world society and upon recognizing how much the contemporary trends of social movements correspond to those "ideal-type" constructions (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 4). In their book *Globalization in Question*, probably the strongest critique of "the strong globalist thesis", Hirst and Thompson are starting from the very same, predominantly Weberian mode of analysis, i.e. from constructing two ideal types: an international economy and an authentically

¹ The term *sceptics* labels quite an incoherent group of authors which include such different positions as: *radicals* (Robert Gillpin /2001/, Linda Weiss /1998/), according to whom globalization represent just another name for a new form of the Western (especially the American) imperialism; *conservatives*, e.g. *realists* and *neorealists* (Stephen Krasner /1995/, Samuel Huntington /1993/, Kenneth Waltz /1999/), who consider globalization as nothing less than a project of states, especially of those powerful ones, without whose hegemony (dominant role) the current international system will be doomed; *social-democrats* (Pol Hirst and Graham Thompson /1999/); *interdependence theoreticians*; *multiculturalists*, who stress all the dangers of cultural homogenization and its devastating effects on local traditions; a variety of *ecological activists* who fear the destructive ecological effects of uncontrolled globalization and many others. All of them, in spite of obvious differences in disciplinary frames, are stressing the devastating destruction of local traditions, continuous marginalization of poor countries and regions, ecological destruction and homogenization of culture and everyday life (Kellner 1997).

global economy and they form a very distinct line between the two.² Whereas the former is still fundamentally characterized by “the exchange between relatively distinct national economies“, the latter is identified as a perfectly integrated world market, in which “the law of one price“ is dominating feature (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7). According to this, the authors conclude that “globalization in its radical since should denote the development of a completely new economic structure, not just conjunctural changes toward an increased international trade and investments“ (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7). The authors’ justification for more than obvious economism lies in simple logic that if they successfully compromise the radical globalist thesis on economic globalization, the other theses on arising the global culture and the global policy will be refuted altogether.

Like Hirst and Thompson, the leading neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1999) insists on the need for differentiation between global and interdependent economy.³ According to Waltz

“Economic globalization would mean that the world economy, or at least the globalized portion of it, would be integrated and not merely interdependent. The difference between an interdependent and an integrated world is a qualitative one and not a mere matter of proportionately more trade and a greater and more rapid flow of capital. With integration, the world would look like one big state. Economic markets and economic interests cannot perform the functions of government. Integration requires or presumes a government to protect, direct, and control. Interdependence, in contrast to integration, is "the mere mutualism" of states, as Emile Durkheim⁴ put it.“ (Waltz 1999)

² These ideal types, as Hirst and Thompson say (1999, p. 7), are valuable as being useful in enabling the specification of the differences between a new global economy and merely extensive and intensifying international economic relationships. “An extreme and one-sided ideal type of this kind enables differentiation of the degrees of internationality“ (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7).

³ The concept of interdependence, which Waltz is obviously alluding on, marked in his time genuine small revolution in academic discipline of international relations (politics), strengthening the importance of the international political economy, which was mainly neglected belonging to the realm of that discipline. The Harvard professor Richard Cooper, in his book *The Economy of Interdependence* (1968), was the first one to point to the increasing importance of economic interdependence among states. Relying on his ideas, Cooper’s Harvard colleagues Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. went on analyzing the concept mentioned and it brought on a hypothesis of growing *complex interdependence* among nations. In their, nowadays already classical book, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977), the authors suggest that a new era of international relations is here to stay and that they cannot be considered as a geostrategic competition among states any more. Economic issues, new means of communication and new patterns of cooperation mark the increase of the world politics in which the international political economy and international institutions play a critical part (see more Woods 2001, p. 283).

⁴ a noted French sociologist.

Waltz claims that the concept of globalization lacks some aspects, pointing to a very simple fact – the fact that the majority of world is left behind, far away of globalistic processes, which particularly applies to most of Africa and Latin America, Russia, all the Middle East except Israel, and large parts of Asia. Moreover, for many countries, the degree of participation in the global economy varies by region. Northern Italy, for example, is in; southern Italy is out (Waltz 1999). “Globalization“ concludes Waltz is, in fact, “not global at all, but is mainly limited to northern latitudes“ (Waltz 1999).

The second important methodological direction has to do with comparing the current trends with those of more than a hundred years ago – with the golden standard epoch between 1870 and 1914, which is often marked as *belle époque* of globalization by some economic historians.⁵ On the basis of the comparison between the contemporary economic trends and those of a hundred years ago, sceptics have come to a conclusion that the extent of today’s internationalization is *not historically unprecedented* (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2004). That is more than obvious when the following is taken into account: firstly, the ratios of national economies trade openness in the period before World War I are higher than those of today; secondly, although the current gross capital flows are far larger in comparison to the previous period, the real net flows are, at least the same; and thirdly, the migration flows in 19th century exceed those of today (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 3). All this point to a conclusion that today’s world economy is much less integrated than it was in the golden standard epoch. “Contrary to popular belief“ says Kevin O’Rourke “the most impressive episode of international economic integration which the world has seen to date was not the second half of the 20th century, but the years between 1870 and the Great War. The 19th century, and in particular the late 19th century, was the period that saw the largest decline ever in inter-continental barriers to trade and factor mobility“ (O’Rourke 2000, p. 2).

The purpose of the reminding about the classical gold standard era at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century, particularly about its catastrophic crash embodied in the Great Depression, is to show that contemporary trends of internationalization and liberalization are not *irreversible* at all (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2004, p. 3). Accordingly, some neorealists claim that without the leadership of the United States as the only hegemonic state presently, the multi-lateral system created after World War II would have collapsed by itself (Gillpin 2001). In the same way and the same scope, the world economy managing still depends on will and interest of the United State (as the world’s most powerful economic subject) to supervise and shape the existing system. The general conclusion which sceptics draw from the basis of the previous analysis is that the

⁵ see more: Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Drache (1999), Garrett (2000).

term globalization represents nothing more than a most common ideological construction, “a necessary myth”⁶, with one purpose: to hide the US government global hegemonic project encapsulated in the so-called Washington consensus – a link between the American government, World Bank and International Monetary Fund – mainly oriented towards further expansion of the neoliberal policies throughout the world.⁷

What the two methodological directions has in common is the assumption that only empirical evidence *per se* can provide the final truth about the nature of globalization phenomenon. The sceptics’ conclusive argument is that the term itself is incoherently deficient; the terms like internationalization, regionalization or triadization have much higher explanatory and descriptive value and provide a much better conceptualization of contemporary affairs.

As it has previously been mentioned, most sceptics are strongly reluctant to the idea that a unique global economy is arising or is already in existence. Their summary argument is that if evidence confirms anything at all, it is only further *internationalization* of economic activity, i.e. more and more intensification of the links between distinct national economies (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 20). However, although sceptics generally do not disapprove of the increasing internationalization of economic trends (mostly with reference to the growing financial capital mobility), they have been warning against interpreting those trends as the arising of the genuine global capitalism which is transcending national economies.⁸ In that respect, one of the main targets of the assault is a deep-rooted (hyper)globalistic belief that the forces of globalization unconditionally lead to convergence towards a *laissez-faire* capitalism. On the contrary, sceptics point out that the divergent forms of capitalism, that is, the market, the mixed and the state capitalism are still vital enough. Correspondingly, Michael Mann writes about the major differences still existing among the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal capitalism, the European social-democratic mixed economy and development states in East Asia (Mann 1997, p. 141-142). The globalistic thesis, as Waltz says, that “economic and technological forces impose near uniformity of political and economic forms and functions on states” is in that way refuted.⁹

The second important conclusion which sceptics draw upon a detailed empirical investigation of contemporary trends of economic activities is related to

⁶ In that sense, a French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu writes that the globalization is “a myth in a full meaning of the word, one mighty discourse, a “powerful idea“, an idea which carries social power“ (Bourdieu 2003, p. 38).

⁷ see more: Held and McGrew (2000, p. 5), Brecher (2003)

⁸ cited in Held (2000, p. 20). For a detailed elaboration see: Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), Hirst and Thompson (1999); Drache (1999).

⁹ The author continues in the same manner: “trade and technology do not determine a single best way to organize a polity and its economy. National systems display a great deal of resilience. Most states survive, and the units that survive in competitive systems are those with the ability to adapt“ (Waltz 1999). On states’ transformative capacities see more: Weiss (1998), Josifidis (2001, 2004).

the fact that trade, investments and financial flows usually fluctuate among three main economic blocks: the European Union, the North America and the Pacific Rome.¹⁰ All that points to the fact that the world economy is far from being perfectly integrated; quite the contrary, it is evident that fragmentation of the world into regional blocks is taking place, featured in the tendency to strengthen economic interdependence and transactions within them but not among them. Moreover, there is a much stronger triadisation of economic activities going on, whose bottom line leads to a further marginalization of the so called Third World.

In addition, contrary to a hiperglobalistic myth, some sceptics claim that truly transnational corporations are very rare indeed.¹¹ It is more than obvious when it is known that only a small number of multinational companies (even the biggest ones) have their residence outside their indigenous countries and that their competitive advantage still depends on the national innovation systems (Cogut 2003). All this, sceptics argue, drive to the conclusion that the national foundations are still very important.

Discarding the thesis on footloose capital mobility, sceptics are at the same time undermining the hyperglobalistic argumentation about deindustrialization of the leading OECD industrial countries; in other words, sceptics' assault is particularly aimed at the assumption that the majority of multinational activities is being transferred to South (the so called "outsourcing") which is causing a greater interdependence between North and South. According to some hyperglobalists, the former marks nothing less than the rising of a new global division of labour, which is characterized by the transference of the core economies from predominantly manufacturing production to services, as well as from primary to manufacturing production in developing countries. As opposed to that, sceptic's claim that the evidence does not support this dramatically shift in the structure of the international division of labour and argue that globalists are deliberately overlooking a further gap-deepening between North and South.¹²

As opposed to explicit scepticism about the very existence of the global economy, sceptics are generally optimistic about possibilities of the international economy effective management, which, as it has been mentioned before, still depends on the great forces' capacities and interests (particularly the USA) to supervise and direct the existing regime.¹³ Thus, one of the radical globalists'

¹⁰ According to Robert Gillpin "most trade takes place among the three advanced industrialized economies - the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, plus a few emerging markets in East Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere" (Gillpin 2001). The author claims that an economic regionalism represents the wave of future. "Today" writes Gillpin "economic regionalism has reached flood tide and is having a significant impact on the international economy" (Gillpin 2001).

¹¹ see Hirst and Thompson (1999, p. 2 and pp. 195-196)

¹² see more in Held and McGrew (2000, p. 21)

¹³ Hirst and Thompson say there exist more different modalities of effective international economy management: 1. through agreements among leading industrial states, particularly among G3; 2.

basic assumptions that states are helpless victims of globalization is being refuted. On the other hand, sceptics argue that national states (especially powerful ones) are their main agents and architects. The market, goes the argument, cannot or will never be able to replace the functions of national governments because without their controlling, protecting and managing role there are no prerequisites for successful integration. The main conclusion related to the previous point is that contemporary trends of internationalization have not changed the basic postulates of managing the international economy.

The previous conclusion is in the same manner related to the problem of managing the national economic space. As far as sceptics are concerned, the state remains the legitimate national manager (though only to some extent) in spite of the explicit trend of economic internationalization (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 171). There is a continuity of welfare state in most advanced industrial states which also speaks in favour of it.¹⁴ Sceptics argue that there is no evidence which would confirm the globalistic claim that the pressures from global financial markets significantly deter governments in realization of their redistributive strategies. Thus, according to Rieger and Leibfried there has not been any radical decrease of welfare state due to economic globalization in any Western European country (Rieger and Leibfried 2000, p. 336). The authors come to conclusion that the stronger the pressure of globalization and the more open a country's economy is, the more difficult it becomes to touch the *status quo* of the welfare state. Geoffrey Garret goes one step further to suggest a quite radical assumption that the growing internationalization (more precisely, the increasing liquid capital mobility) is even connected with the fast-growing government expenditure (Garret 1998, p. 301)! On that account, the author claims that the average state consumption as GDP proportion inside the OECD states almost doubled from 1960-s till mid 1990-s by which it reached near half of the overall output.

In that way, the central sceptics' point related to the preservation of state's power and functions has been reached: the world, as they argue, is still state-centric while today's states are more powerful than ever, particularly in relation to their capacity for effective management of domestic and international economic activities.¹⁵ In that respect, Waltz writes that

through international regulative agencies, such as WTO; 3. through trade blocks, e.g. EU or NAFTA; 4. through nationally founded policies etc. (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 189).

¹⁴ According to sceptics, the general belief by which irresistible globalization pressures narrow the welfare state doesn't hold. For a detailed analysis of relationship between neoliberalism and welfare state see more Josifidis and Prekajac (2005).

¹⁵ "This is not the end of the nation-state, and even less the end of government" say Yergin and Stanislaw (2000, p. 321). Similarly, Robert Gillpin emphasizes that this is the world in which national policies and domestic economies are still "the main determinants of economic affairs" (Gillpin 2001). For a sharp criticism of the end of state thesis see also: Mann (1997, p. 146), Weiss (1998), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Waltz (1999).

“International politics remains *inter-national* (italic by T.T.). Global or world politics has not taken over from national politics. The twentieth century was the century of the nation-state. The twenty-first will be too.“ (Waltz 1999)

Politics, as Kenneth Waltz concludes, “as usual, prevails over economics“ (Waltz 1999).

Finally, sceptics also disregard the hyperglobalistic thesis on arising the first global civilization characterized by universal cultural patterns as a most common illusion: contrary to that, they point out that further deepening of nationalism, religious fundamentalism strengthening, is causing the fragmentation of the world into civilization’s blocks as well as cultural and ethnic enclaves. As Samuel Huntington warns, it is not “the end of history“ but “the clash of civilizations“ that the world is slipping in (Huntington 1996).

3. Conclusion

The essential points of the previous extensive analysis can be summarized as shown in table 1.

The brief summary of the great globalization debate central points reveals a deep-rooted gap between globalistic and sceptic notion of the globalization’s basic essence. The conclusion has particularly been emphasized by diametrically opposite conceptual frames of globalization phenomenon, different understandings of its causes and consequences as well as by diverse prediction of its future trajectory. Namely, whereas globalists, generally speaking, determine globalization as a qualitatively new epoch unprecedented in earlier history which main causes can be found in the very structure of capitalism or, as some moderate globalists would say, in combined forces of modernity, sceptics disregard this thesis as a most common myth, i.e. an ideological project of the West. If the gravity centre of analysis is shifted to the domain of the most important consequences of globalization, then the different notions of the globalization phenomenon are even more emphasized. While hyperglobalists are celebrating the arising of the first truly global civilization based on its own mechanisms of global economy, global politics and global culture, sceptics claim that the contemporary trends are pointing nothing more but the intensification of economy internationalization in which national governments and national cultural identities remain very important indeed. Settled in between these polarities (but still remaining under globalistic perspective), there are those scholars, arguing that something is really going on, that globalization is generating some effects, which are, certainly, although gradually, changing the old structures and relations. That is evident from the evolution of postindustrial economies, the reconstruction of

state power and the hybridization of national cultures as a logical consequence of the dialectics of global and local influences. The culmination of the great globalization debate is represented in absolutely different visions about the future trajectory of global change. For most hyperglobalists, today's happenings mark nothing less but the beginning of the end of history; in contrast, sceptics argue that the history is far from its ending but the world is on the verge of the clash between civilizations, fragmentation and chaos. As opposed to these predominantly deterministic views, there is an explicit indeterminism noticeable in the most transformationalist analyses, which represent a logical consequence of their notion of globalization as an essentially contingent and contradictory historical process which by itself excludes all the possibilities of any predetermined pattern of future development.

Table 1. The central points of globalists and sceptics

	Globalists		Sceptics
	Radical	Moderate	
I Conceptualization	A new era	A contingent and contradictory historical process	Nothing new; ideology and myth
II Main causes	<i>Laissez faire</i> capitalism and technology	Combined forces of modernity	Project of the West
III Main consequences			
a) economic	New global economy	Post-industrial economy	Internationalisation of economy
b) political	The end of state; global government	Reconstruction and restructuring of state power	States are more powerful than ever
c) cultural	Homogenization	Hybridization	Fragmentation
IV Future prediction	The end of history, global civilization	Indeterminism	Clash of civilizations

Source: Some parts of table 1 are taken from Held et al. (1999, p. 10)

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Debata o globalizaciji: Globalisti

Rezime: Većina pretpostavki globalista, naročito onih radikalnih, našla se na udaru žestoke kritike skeptički orijentisanih teoretičara za koje globalizacija nije epohalna transformacija svetskih poslova, već najobičniji mit, odnosno ideološki projekat Zapada. Opovrgavanje tvrdog jezgra hiperglobalističke argumentacije skeptici najčešće realizuju kroz prizmu dva osnovna metodološka okvira. Prvi pravac, koji dominira u najvećem broju skeptičkih analiza, sastoji se u konstruisanju apstraktnih modela globalne ekonomije, globalne kulture i svetskog društva i utvrđivanju u kojoj meri savremeni trendovi društvenih kretanja odgovaraju naznačenim idealno-tipskim konstrukcijama. Drugi važan metodološki pravac odnosi se na upoređivanje savremenih trendova sa onima od pre više od jednog stoleća – tačnije sa epohom zlatnog standarda od 1870-1914, koju pojedini ekonomski istoričari često označavaju kao *belle époque* globalizacije. Zajedničko za oba metodološka pristupa jeste pretpostavka da samo empirijska evidencija *per se* može da pruži konačnu istinu o prirodi fenomena globalizacije.

Generalan zaključak koji skeptici izvlače na osnovu detaljnog kritičkog preispitivanja globalističke argumentacije jeste da globalizacija ne predstavlja ništa drugo do najobičniju ideološku konstrukciju – "neophodan mit" – koji služi da bi se prikrio globalni hegemoni projekat SAD, ovaploćen u takozvanom Vašingtonskom konsenzusu – sprezi Američke vlade, Svetske banke i Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda u globalnom širenju neoliberalnih politika širom sveta. Sâm taj termin – sumarni je argument skeptika – suštinski je nedostatan; mnogo veću eksplanatornu i deskriptivnu vrednost imaju pojmovi kao što su: internacionalizacija, regionalizacija ili trijadizacija, kojima se daleko bolje mogu konceptualizovati savremena zbivanja.

Jedna od glavnih meta skeptičkog napada jeste hiperglobalistička argumentacija o izrastanju, odnosno postojanju jedinstvene globalne ekonomije. Ako evidencija potvrđu-

je bilo šta, mišljenje je većine skeptika, onda je to daljnja *internacionalizacija* ekonomske aktivnosti, to jest, sve jača intezifikacija veza između zasebnih nacionalnih ekonomija.

Drugi značajan zaključak koji skeptici izvlače na osnovu iscrpnog empirijskog ispitivanja savremenih trendova ekonomskih aktivnosti odnosi se na činjenicu da trgovina, investicije i finansijski tokovi fluktuiraju uglavnom unutar i između tri glavna ekonomska bloka: Evropske unije, Severne Amerike i Pacifičkog Rima. Sve to, tvrde ovi autori, ukazuje da je svetska ekonomija daleko od perfektno integrisane; ono što je, nasuprot tome, evidentno jeste fragmentacija sveta na regionalne blokove (štaviše na sceni je trijadizadija ekonomskih aktivnosti), pri čemu je izražena tendencija jačanja ekonomske međuzavisnosti i transakcija unutar navedenih regiona, a ne između njih.

Nadalje, nasuprot hiperglobalističkom mitu, pojedini skeptici tvrde da su istinske transnacionalne korporacija veoma retke i da vrlo malo broj (čak i onih najvećih) ima sedišta izvan matičnih zemalja pri čemu njihova konkurentska prednost i dalje u najvećoj meri zavisi od nacionalnih sistema inovacija. Sve to, smatraju skeptici, upućuje na zaključak da je za većinu ovih korporacija nacionalna utemeljenost i dalje veoma bitna.

Odbacujući tezu o nesputanoj mobilnosti kapitala, skeptici istovremeno potkopavaju i hiperglobalističku argumentaciju o deindustrijalizaciji vodećih industrijskih zemalja OECD-a, kao i njihove pretpostavke o izrastanju nove globalne podele rada čiju osnovnu karakteristiku predstavlja prelazak ekonomija centra sa predominantno manufakturne proizvodnje na uslužnu, i zemalja u razvoju sa primarne na manufakturnu proizvodnju. Skeptici, nasuprot tome, ukazuju da evidencija ne podupire ovaj dramatičan obrt u strukturi međunarodne podele rada, i smatraju da je reč o najobičnijem preterivanju, čime se namerno previđa daljnje produbljivanje jaza na relaciji Sever-Jug.

Za razliku od izraženog skepticizma u pogledu postojanja globalne ekonomije, skeptici su generalno optimistični oko mogućnosti efektivnog upravljanja međunarodnom ekonomijom, pri čemu ono, kao što je već rečeno, i dalje u najvećoj meri zavisi od kapaciteta i interesa velikih sila (posebno Sjedinjenih Država) da nadziru i usmeravaju postojeći poredak. Time se dodatno ruši još jedna od bazičnih pretpostavki radikalnih globalista – teza da su države nemoćne žrtve globalizacije. Upravo suprotno, tvrde skeptici, nacionalne države (naročito one moćne) njeni su glavni agenti i arhitekti.

Prethodni zaključak se u istoj meri odnosi i na problematiku upravljanja nacionalnim ekonomskim prostorom. Država, prema skepticima, i dalje ostaje legitimni nacionalni menadžer (doduše u donekle manjoj meri), usprkos izraženom trendu ka internacionalizaciji ekonomije. S tim u vezi, skeptici tvrde da je svet i dalje strogo državocentričan, dok su države danas moćnije nego ikad, naročito u pogledu kapaciteta za efikasno upravljanje domaćim i međunarodnim ekonomskim aktivnostima.

Konačno, skeptici odbacuju hiperglobalističku tezu o skorom izrastanju prve globalne civilizacije koja se karakteriše univerzalnim kulturnim obrascima, kao najobičniju iluziju; nasuprot tome, oni ukazuju na daljnje produbljivanje nacionalizma, jačanje verskog fundamentalizma, što, u krajnjoj liniji, dovodi do fragmentacije sveta na civilizacijske blokove i kulturne i etničke enklave. Sve to je navelo pojedine skeptike, poput Semjuela Hantingona, na tvrdnju da svet nije pred “krajem istorije“ već nezadrživo klizi ka “sukobu civilizacija“.

Ključne reči: Globalizacija, Velika debata o globalizaciji, Skeptici.

JEL: F0, F15, N0